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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
DONA R. BULLOCK, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs0 
HERBERT JOHN UNGRICHT, 
et al., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No 
13697 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Appellant Dona R. Bullock respectfully petitions 
the Court for a rehearing in this cause upon grounds as follows: 
I. 
The trial court erred in refusing to exclude certain 
inflammatory evidence highly prejudicial to the Appellant's 
cause, and this Court erred in sustaining the judgment of the 
trial court based thereonc 
WHEREFORE, Appellant asks for a rehearing in this 
cause, that the matter be reconsidered and upon such rehearing 
the Court grant a new trialc 
ORRIN G. HATCH 
WINSTON LANGLOIS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
Suite 420 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84010 
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BRIEF IN 
SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by the Plaintiff/Appellant, Dona 
R. Bullock, against the Defendants/Respondents, Herbert John 
Ungricht, et al., for injuries and damages sustained as a result 
of an automobile accident. 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE 
A jury award of no cause of action in favor of the 
Defendants was rendered April 4, 1974, before the Honorable 
Bryant H. Croft, District Judge of the Third Judicial District. 
A motion for a new trial was heard and denied. From the denial 
of such motion and from the judgment, the Plaintiff appealed. 
This Court affirmed the judgment below. Bullock v. Ungricht, 
(decision no. 13697, filed July 17, 1975). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON THIS PETITION 
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment of the trial 
court and a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff's cause of action arises from an automobile 
accident that took place on December 16, 1971 at 1435 East 33rd 
South Street in Salt Lake City, Utah at about 9:30 p.m. (R. 
246-249). According to Defendants1 version of the accident, 
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after Defendants had made a left-hand turn onto 33rd South Street 
from Highland Drive, they noticed erratic accelerating and 
slowing by the Plaintiff's vehicle in front of them. Defendant 
claims to have slowed his car at this time to observe what Plain-
tiff's vehicle would do but subsequently and unavoidably slammed 
into the rear of Plaintiffs' car when it stopped abruptly to 
make a left turn. There was testimony by investigating officers 
that the road surface was coated with black ice. (R. 581, 608). 
Defendant claims there were no cars in the westbound lanes that 
would have required the Plaintiff to stop before turning left. 
According to the Plaintiff's version of the accident, 
she had turned left onto 33rd South Street. She was stopped 
on 33rd South Street in the centermost eastbound lane with her 
left-turn signal blinking, waiting for traffic to clear to allow 
her to turn left into the driveway of an apartment building. 
She noticed headlights approach rapidly in the rearview mirror 
and shortly thereafter her automobile was struck from the rear 
by the Defendants' automobile. The resulting impact caused 
serious permanent damage to the Plaintiff's sixth cervical nerve, 
necessitating the removal of two cervical discs. 
In addition to negligence and contributory negligence, 
an issue had originally been raised with respect to the Plain-
tiff's lost earnings resulting from her injuries. Plaintiff 
claimed $8,000.00 in wages lost due to her inability to continue 
to work as the sales director for Utah American Corporation. 
Midway through the trial, the court removed the issue 
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of the Plaintiffs lost earnings from the jury's consideration 
on the grounds that the evidence of lost earnings was too specu-
lative to support an award for the same0 (R. 430), 
After the trial court eliminated the Plaintiff's lost 
earnings as a triable issue, the trial court refused to remove 
evidence from the jury's consideration that was admissible only 
for its probative value with respect to the issue removed. 
(R. 431). Such evidence, improperly kept before the jury, 
was inflammatory and greatly damaged the Plaintiff's credibility 
in the eyes of the jury. The factual circumstances of the 
court's improper ruling in this respect will be set forth in 
more detail in Plaintiff's argument. 
The jury deliberated more than five hours before return-
ing a verdict of no cause action, and never reached the issue 
of damages. 
ARGUMENT 
THIS COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE TRIAL COURT'S ERRON-
EOUS INSISTENCE THAT INFLAMMATORY AND HIGHLY PREJUDICIAL EVIDENCE 
REMAIN BEFORE THE JURY NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT SUCH EVIDENCE 
WAS RELEVANT AND ADMISSIBLE ONLY FOR ITS PROBATIVE VALUE WITH 
RESPECT TO AN ISSUE PREVIOUSLY REMOVED FROM THE JURY'S CONSIDERA-
TION. 
The trial court's erroneous ruling arose in the 
following manner. The Plaintiff had called several witnesses 
to testify concerning her earning abilities as they related 
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to her claim for lost earnings. The fact that her employer, 
Utah American Corporation, had not yet begun to do business 
was elicited. While cross-examining the Plaintiff, Defendant's 
counsel introduced the Plaintiff's prior act of bankruptcy in 
the following manner: 
Q Your business venture as a salesman for Inch 
Master was very unsuccessful, was it not, Mrs. Bullock? 
A Correct. 
Q And, in fact, it resulted, did it not, in the 
filing of a bankruptcy petition by you in April of 
1971? 
A Yes, it did. 
MR. LANGLOIS: Your Honor, I really have no objec-
tion to our going into this. It really doesn't mean 
anything. I fail to see the relativity of it. That is 
the thing I am concerned about. What is a fact is a 
fact. I fail to see how this has anything to do with 
this case. The only reason her business operation --
THE COURT: Just a moment, Mr. Langlois. Do you 
object to the question? 
MR. LANGLOIS: I object because it is irrelevant, 
incompetent and immaterial. 
THE COURT: Overruled. I think it is material. 
Q (By Mr. Eyre) The bankruptcy petition which 
you .filed, Mrs. Bullock, was the cause, I assume, of some 
additional emotional upset and trauma for you, was it 
not? 
A Yes. 
Q And that continued for quite a period of time, 
did it not? 
A Not, it didn't. It was a relief to have it 
all over. 
Q Well, it wasn't quite all over when you filed 
it, was it? Mainly, isn't it a fact, Mrs. Bullock, 
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i 
that certain of your creditors, namely, First Security 
Bank, Walker Bank $ Trust Company filed actions against * 
you in the bankruptcy court alleging that you had 
incurred obligations to them through the use of mis- 1 
representation? | 
• • • • i 
Q (By Mr. Eyre) Mrs. Bullock, as a result of, the 
bankruptcy proceedings were judgments entered against 
you in favor of First Security Bank of Utah and Walker I 
Bank § Trust Company and are those judgments still ' 
not paid? (R. 395-97). 
There was, therefore, introduced into evidence over the I 
objection of the Plaintiff's counsel, the fact of Plaintiff's i 
prior bankruptcy, the fact that two creditors had filed claims 
against the Plaintiff alleging misrepresentations by her, and 
the fact that those claims resulted in two judgments against 
the Plaintiff that remained unpaid. I 
The tendency of such evidence to destroy the credibility ] 
of the Plaintiff in the eyes of the jury is self-evident. The 
issue of how and on what terms such evidence may properly be 
submitted to and remain before the jury is crucial in determining 
whether the Plaintiff had been denied her right to a fair trial 
of her action for negligently inflicted personal injuries. 
The trial court and counsel for both parties clearly 
stated the theories upon which they either favored or opposed 
retention of the challenged evidence during an off-the-record 
discussion of the matter, recorded at pages 412 to 436 of the 
official record. 
At page 415, line 30, to page 416, line 13, the Defen-
dants1 counsel lists his purposes in submitting the challenged 
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evidence; 
t . . I recognize that counsel doesn't like it 
because, in my judgment, it will have an adverse effect 
and that is wny I am seeking to introduce it. I will 
be quite candid with the Court. It does have probative 
value because it deals directly with her ability to 
earn and her sales ability, her general business 
ethics, which I think are relevant if she is going 
to assert a claim for lost income because of this 
business venture she was in. 
In addition to that, it goes to the claim for 
pain and suffering, which her doctor says, at least, 
when he last examined, he felt was caused by the 
emotional functional overlay. In addition to that, 
I think it does have some probative value concerning 
her credibility and I will submit it on that basis. 
Defendant's counsel thus expressly offered the evidence 
of the Plaintiff's act of bankruptcy and undischargeable debts 
for its value for discrediting the Plaintiff apart from, and 
in addition to, whatever value it had for rebutting the Plain-
tiff's claim for lost earnings. The Defendant's counsel, there-
fore, submitted the fact of the Plaintiff's bankruptcy and her 
undischargeable and unpaid debts as specific acts tending to 
destroy the credibility of the Plaintiff. Even had the 
issue of the Plaintiff's earning capacity not been previously 
eliminated as a trial issue by the trial court, it was reversible 
error for the trial court to refuse to give the jury an instruc-
tion limiting its consideration of the challenged evidence to 
the issue of the Plaintiff's lost earnings. 
The reversible error of the trial court was compounded 
when the trial court itself removed the issue of the Plaintiff's 
lost earnings from the jury's consideration (R. 430). It sub-
sequently refused to strike the evidence of the Plaintiff's 
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act of bankruptcy and of her undischargeable and unpaid debts 
or to instruct the jury to disregard them. At this point in 
the trial, the only relevance of the challenged evidence was 
its tendency to destroy the credibility of the Plaintiff. To 
affect the credibility of a witness by introducing evidence 
of her specific acts relevant only as tending to prove a trait 
of character is expressly forbidden by Rule 22(c), Utah Rules 
of Evidence. The Plaintiff submits that if it violates Rule 
22(c) to introduce evidence of specific acts relevant only 
for their tendency to affect the general credibility of a wit-
ness, it is, by necessary inference, a violation of Rule 22(c) 
not to strike such evidence when it later becomes irrelevant 
except for its tendency to affect the general credibility of 
a witnesSo 
Here the trial court refused to strike evidence of 
the Plaintiff's act of bankruptcy and of suffering judgments 
based in part on allegations of misrepresentation, after such 
evidence had become irrelevant except for its tendency to affect 
the general credibility of the Plaintiff. This error was raised 
by the Plaintiff in her initial brief on appeal but not con-
sidered by this Court in its opinion. 
Should there be any doubt that the trial court, while 
exercising its discretion to exclude evidence admissible for 
some purposes but inadmissible for others, contemplated that 
the challenged evidence would be used to attack the general 
credibility of the Plaintiff, that doubt is dispelled by the 
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trial court's following direction to counsel: 
MR. LANGLOIS; And the bankruptcy, for whatever 
that is worth, I guess he can talk about it and so 
can I then? 
THE COURT: You ought to talk about it only 
insofar as it might affect credibility. If I take 
from the jury the question of special damages for 
loss of earnings, as I think I will do based upon 
what I have heard so far, then you shouldn't discuss 
either the business venture that was intended or the 
bankruptcy as affecting the success -- the probable 
success of that business in your argument to the jury. 
(R. 434-435). 
Should there be any doubt about the determination 
of the trial court to keep the challenged evidence before the 
jury, that doubt is dispelled by its refusal of the motion of 
Defendant's counsel to strike the prayer for lost earnings from 
the Plaintiff's complaint, despite the consent of counsel for 
both parties to such motion. (R. 432). 
There is little room for doubt that the evidence of 
Plaintiff's act of bankruptcy, of the claims against her alleg-
ing misrepresentation, and of the unpaid judgments resulting from 
those claims seriously damaged her credibility with the jury. 
The Plaintiff's account of the accident was clear and concise. 
If believed, it compelled a finding of negligence on the part 
of the Defendant and an absence of contributory negligence on 
the Plaintiff's parte The fact the jury deliberated for more 
than five hours before returning a verdict of no cause of action 
in favor of the Defendant demonstrates the closeness of the 
question of credibility in the minds of the jury and the high 
probability that the improperly retained evidence tipped the 
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1 
scales on that issue against the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff's I 
right to a fair trial of her claim for personal injuries negli-
gently inflicted was thereby denied. I 
CONCLUSION I 
This Court failed to consider the prejudicial error i 
of the trial court in two respects. First, the error of the 
trial court in receiving inflammatory and highly prejudicial 
evidence of the Plaintiff's specific acts for the tendency to 
rebut material evidence but refusing to instruct the jury to | 
limit its consideration of such inflammatory evidence to the i 
issue for which it was offered. Second, the error of the trial 
court in refusing to strike inflammatory and highly prejudicial 
evidence of the Plaintiff's specific acts after such evidence 
had become irrelevant except for its tendency to affect the 
general credibility of the Plaintiff, violating, by necessary 
inference, Rule 22(c) of.the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ORRIN G. HATCH 
WINSTON LANGLOIS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
Suite 420 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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